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ABSTRACT Individual responsibilities and individual capabilities are becoming 
increasingly important in public policies of European welfare states. Therefore, it is 
said that European welfare states are developing in the direction of social investment 
states. In this article we argue that the shift towards the social investment state 
may lead to new social risks and new inequalities. Building upon Bonoli’s (2005) 
seminal article, we introduce the concept of ‘social investment risks’ to refer to 
these risks. In this article we explore and identify the development towards a social 
investment state in detail by focusing on different social policy trends in different 
welfare areas and by analyzing their impact on the individual level. We deconstruct 
the underlying assumptions of the social investment paradigm and reflect on the 
role of individual capabilities and social capital in the social investment state. 
We assess to what extent the distribution of these capabilities creates new social 
risks and new inequalities using examples from the Netherlands. Dealing with 
these new inequalities and new social risks may be considered new challenges for 
welfare states. Therefore, this article innovatively expands the borders of current-
day welfare state research and explores the consequences of the social investment 
paradigm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1973 European welfare states have been undergoing a continuous 
process of adjustment to fiscal austerity and new social, political and economic 
conditions. The readjustment of the post-war welfare state first led to processes 
of political and economic reform in most welfare states (see Pierson, 1994; 
compare Castles, 2004). In time, the politics of retrenchment dominant in the 
1970s and 1980s gave way to the politics of institutional change (cf. Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Pierson, 1994). The division of 
responsibilities between the state, citizens, firms, interest groups and the so-
called third sector in the policies of the welfare state changed. This led to a 
transformation of social policies: an increase in the individual responsibility 
of actors (citizens, employees, firms, professionals, etc.) under the umbrella of 
– and not instead of – state-organized social policies. This process has been 
characterized as a transition towards a social investment state: a welfare state 
in which social policies are mainly oriented towards and also legitimized by 
investment in human capital. Traditional welfare states aimed at providing 
compensation for the occurrence of traditional social risks like old age, disability 
and unemployment. The social investment state is aimed at preventing these risks 
by educating citizens and enhancing individual capabilities to build resilience. 
The transformation from traditional welfare states into social investment states 
involves institutional readjustments. One of the most significant changes is 
related to the issue of scale: the division of authorities between national, regional 
and local government. Administrative and governmental responsibilities are 
decentralized to local or sectorial authorities or centralized with supra-national 
authorities (Kazepov, 2010). This also entails an increasing emphasis on civil 
society as a distributor of welfare. This fits within the discourse of the big 
society which sees citizens as ‘autonomous, self-reliant and democratically 
engaged individuals working for common purpose’ (Bone, 2012: 11).
We argue that, because of these processes, the capabilities and social capital 
of individuals are becoming central determinants within the welfare system. 
As a result, new divisions are created which may present new social risks and 
new inequalities. This article aims to explore these new social risks and new 
inequalities that may be caused by the transition towards a social investment 
state. In doing so, the article contributes to an emerging body of literature on 
the shift towards a social investment state (see Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Hemerijck, 
2012; Ellison and Fenger, 2013). We develop a theoretically based typology of 
social investment risks which makes policy officials and social policy scholars 
more sensitive to the potential pathological policy consequences of the social 
investment state.
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This article is structured as follows: In the next section, we elaborate on 
the background of the social investment state. In Section 3 we move on to a 
discussion of the new social risks as they have been identified by Bonoli (2005). 
In Section 4 we reflect on the underlying assumptions of the social investment 
paradigm. Section 5 forms the core of this article: there we present an overview 
of social risks in the social investment state. In the final section we reflect on 
the meaning of these social investment risks for practical policy making and 
research of the social investment paradigm. 
TOWARDS SOCIAL INVESTMENT? 
The welfare states that were developed in the first decades of the twentieth 
century and matured in in the early post-war decades were intended to protect 
citizens from traditional social risks like unemployment, poverty, and illness. 
However, the measures that were implemented – health insurance, unemployment 
insurance and social assistance – focus on repairing ‘damage’ after it happens. 
Social investment policy, in contrast, aims to prepare instead of repair individuals 
in relation to the labor market (Giddens, 1998). The social investment state aims 
to increase social inclusion and minimize the intergenerational cycle of poverty in 
order to protect individuals from the increasing insecurity (flexibilization) of the 
labor market. It aims to do so in a manner which does not undermine individual 
responsibility for one’s own personal well-being, and in a way that helps the 
system cope with changing demographics like an aging population and the de-
traditionalization of the family (Jenson, 2012: 61-7). Three principles are central to 
the social investment perspective. The first is based on the equality of opportunity, 
and thereby follows the liberal notion of equality. By creating equal opportunities 
through investment the intergenerational cycle of poverty should be broken. 
Therefore, the social investment paradigm highlights the importance of education 
and the prominent position it has in the lives of all. Early childhood education and 
life-long learning are, besides formal education, the main routes to social security 
and a way to overcome new inequalities based on technology and skills. 
The second principle rests on the premise that promoting social inclusion 
by investing in individuals and thereby expanding active and civil society is 
beneficial to the collective good (Jenson & Saint Martin, 2006). Hence, the 
development of human capital and labor market mobility are the main concepts 
of the social investment perspective (Taylor-Gooby, 2008). This requires an 
‘empowering’ or ‘active’ state which focuses on partnerships with non-profit 
and private market parties and ‘restructures’, ‘redesigns’ or ‘recasts’ the welfare 
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state (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012: 1-19). According to this perspective, the 
state provides opportunities for individual citizens, but it is the responsibility of 
citizens to use these opportunities. For instance, Jenson and St. Martin (2003) 
highlight the active role that is required of citizens in the social investment 
paradigm. The state in the social investment paradigm is an enabling state with 
active and responsible citizens.  
Recent trends indicate that many European welfare states increasingly show 
characteristics of social investment states. The development of more individualized 
social services, personalized around the needs of the individual (Gerven & 
Ossewaarde, 2012: 49), demands a new and complex system of administration 
(Pfeifer, 2009: 118). Social policies have to deal with the individualization of social 
risks and the fact that personal risk biographies are being formed by the choices 
individuals make (Giddens, in Gerven & Ossewaarde, 2012: 39). The distributive 
effects of these new services are dependent on the distribution of formal welfare 
(collectively organized) and on the access citizens have to informal welfare (social 
support). Access to formal and informal welfare is dependent on the (bureaucratic 
and social) capabilities of individuals, and capabilities to acquire and manage 
formal and informal welfare differ. 
However, whether this social investment strategy is actually being 
implemented and in what scope is still under debate. “In most countries the 
investment in knowledge and employment mobility enhancing benefits that are 
distinctive parts of the new approach are not being effectively pursued.” (Taylor-
Gooby, 2008: 18). It may be that the social investment approach is only used as 
a rhetorical strategy to disguise a continuing politics of retrenchment (Taylor-
Gooby & Stoker, 2011; Wiggan, 2012). One may ask whether this phenomenon 
results from liberal ideology, the promotion of free-market capitalism and 
personal freedom (Friedman, 1982), or from the development of social 
investment. Individual responsibility figures prominently in both discourses. 
The possibility exists that after years of convergence towards a European model 
of welfare distribution (the trend to Europeanization of the welfare state model) 
two discourses have emerged: one of neoliberalism and the other of social 
investment. However, both discourses emphasize individual responsibility. 
NEW SOCIAL RISKS 
In his influential article ‘The politics of the new social policies’, Bonoli (2005) 
argued that due to socioeconomic transformations new social risks have evolved 
in addition to the traditional social risks that were introduced earlier, like old age, 
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sickness, disability and unemployment. Due to the tertiarization of employment 
and the massive entry of women into the labor market, different risk profiles 
have emerged in post-industrial societies. Industrial workers traditionally had 
the highest risk profiles, but because of the homogeneity of the labor class and of 
family structures, these risks were easy to target. They also had strong political 
mobilization capacities to ensure improvement of their living standards. In the 
post-industrial society, these risk profiles have, however, changed. Because of 
individualization and de-traditionalization more social diversity exists within 
classes and families, making it harder to effectively target social risks through 
standardized policy measures. Due to what Bonoli describes as new social risks, 
welfare states have transformed and tried to adapt (Bonoli, 2005). But what are 
these new social risks and whom do they affect?
Bonoli (Ibid: 433-5) describes five new social risks that are related to 
the post-industrial society. The first new social risk he describes is the 
‘reconciliation of work and family life’. Because of the changed division of 
domestic and childcare work within the family, these activities are now being 
externalized, with the state and the market as the main suppliers. Problems 
arise when they cannot be adequately supplied and family members need to 
reduce working hours in order to cope. This results in great losses of welfare. 
This risk is even higher for ‘single parent families’, the second new social 
risk. Bonoli considers having a frail relative to also be a new social risk. 
Because of the changed work patterns of women, care for the frail elderly 
or disabled is also externalized. This task was usually performed by non-
employed women. When services are not able to provide adequate care, 
people are made responsible for caring for their frail relatives, which also may 
result in losses of welfare. These new social risks are all related to the family 
situation of an individual. The fourth new social risk Bonoli distinguishes 
is ‘the possession of low or absolute skills’. Unlike in the post-war period 
when low-skilled workers were employed in the manufacturing industry, low-
skilled workers nowadays are mostly employed in low value-added services, 
like cleaning, hospitality, retail-sales and the like, or they are unemployed. 
Job creation is limited in these sectors and people work most of the time for 
minimum wage or a poverty wage. Thus, having low skills or no skills at 
all entails a very high risk of the loss of welfare. The final new social risk 
according to Bonoli is having insufficient social security coverage. Because 
changing labor market career profiles and social security schemes are still 
based on the traditional career profile of the full-time employed male, having 
an a-typical career profile results in incomplete social security coverage and a 
loss of welfare. Young people, women and the low-skilled are mostly exposed 
to these new social risks.
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These new social risks occur because the traditional welfare states, which 
are geared towards compensating and decommodification, have not been 
fully adapted to the reality of post-industrial societies. The social investment 
paradigm, as discussed in the second section of this article, might be considered 
an adjustment of traditional welfare regimes to the post-industrial era in 
which individual characteristics and behavior are considered more important 
determinants of social risk than structural economic or social conditions. So 
the social investment paradigm may be considered a response to Bonoli’s new 
social risks. However, as we claim in this article, introducing a social investment 
strategy in its place may result in other types of social risks. In this article we 
label these risks social investment risks. 
CAPABILITIES, SOCIAL CAPITAL  
AND INEQUALITIES 
In this section we will consider the social investment paradigm from a 
capabilities perspective. The social investment state builds upon existing 
capabilities of citizens and tries to improve these capabilities if needed. By 
focusing on capabilities we avoid an overly simplistic analysis of the distribution 
of welfare that focuses on just the means or the ability that individuals have to 
acquire wellbeing through their participation in the labor market (the human 
capital approach). We perceive the concept of capability as “the opportunity 
to achieve valuable combinations of human functionings – what a person is 
able to do or be” (Sen, 2005: 153). It therefore goes beyond the concept of 
human capital because it also incorporates social development instead of just 
economic development (Sen, 1997). The capabilities someone possesses are 
not only personal traits or the result of someone’s personal network, but also 
the result of institutional influences. For example, the degree of universalism 
of the educational system determines to a large extent the chances available 
to citizens to obtain and expand capabilities. Therefore welfare reforms will 
have different effects in different welfare state regimes for different categories of 
citizens. Differences in the distribution of social protection by the welfare state 
have always existed, but the growing importance of the capabilities of actors 
may increase these differences (Leschke & Jespen, 2012).
When social policies are individualized and personalized and social policy 
emphasis shifts to civil society, not only personal capabilities but also social 
capital becomes more important. We define social capital in the same way as 
Putnam (2001: 19): ‘social capital refers to connections among individuals – 
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise 
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from them’. In the theoretical discussion several kinds of social capital are 
defined. Two of the most prominent sub-concepts are bonding and bridging 
social capital. Bonding social capital refers to strong network ties and is usually 
located within families, groups of close friends and tightly structured religious, 
political or ethnic groups. This kind of social capital produces social support 
and social control but is inclusive for group members only. A perverse side 
effect is that it can create too much social pressure on group members with 
pathological consequences (for instance, see Durkheim, 2013 [1897]). Bridging 
social capital refers to weak social ties. These kinds of social ties let individuals 
bridge greater social distance than bonding ties do. Especially when it comes 
to information gathering and sharing, bridging social capital is of greater 
worth (Kääriäinen & Lehtonen, 2006:29-30). Granovetter (1973) calls this ‘the 
strength of weak ties’. These different types of social capital may have different 
values in the accumulation of welfare, depending on the type of support that 
is needed. When asking for health care, bonding social capital is probably of 
greater worth than bridging social capital, and vice versa when it comes to 
seeking a job outside the formal job market. The distribution of welfare then is 
not only the result of formal welfare arrangements but also of the access citizens 
have to informal welfare, which is highly dependent on their social capital. This 
raises the question how welfare state policies interact with the social capital of 
individuals. Traditionally, welfare state policies are supposed to 'crowd out' 
social capital, which means that informal social relations are taken over by 
formal (collectively organized) forms of support (Putnam, 2000). Evidence 
supporting this claim is not always straightforward and is sometimes even 
contradictory (Oorschot and Arts, 2005:21-22). However, differences appear 
to exist between different forms of social policy and its effect on social capital. 
It is possible that welfare state policy can both diminish and promote social 
capital (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen, 2006; Grootegoed 
and van Dijk, 2012). In addition to the possession of social capital, there is 
also an issue related to the use of social capital. According to Elchardus and 
Pelleriaux (2001), the implementation of active policy has cultural effects that 
go beyond the desired economic effects. Due to the changing notion of personal 
responsibility, labor is seen as the first and foremost way to take responsibility, 
not only in terms of taking care of others but also taking care of oneself. One 
can hypothesize that this changed notion of individual responsibility also 
affects the way individuals judge themselves in times of need. People may 
blame themselves more frequently, instead of blaming others for their miseries. 
Consequently, they will ask for less (or no) help from others because they 
consider that they themselves are to blame, and are thus not entitled to receive 
care or assistance, or to a lesser degree. 
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The increasing emphasis on human capabilities and individual responsibilities 
can also have a perverse effect. First, it increases the predictability and the 
visibility of those who are dependent on welfare state support. According to 
Elchardus, Marx and Pelleriaux (2003) this can undermine the legitimacy of 
the welfare state because social cleavages, for example between the higher 
and lower educated, or between different ethnic groups, become more visible 
and intensify. When individual responsibility and capabilities are a central 
variable in the social rights of citizens and in the workings of social policies it 
is possible that this will stimulate feelings of deprivation and exclusion among 
those dependent on the welfare state. By emphasizing merit and by employing 
a philosophy of equal chance the discontent among the lower classes in general 
will be heightened. 
The social investment state is based on the equality of opportunities, upward 
social mobility and individual responsibility through investment-type policies 
that promote more equality within society. However, the notion of investment 
also involves the notion of revenue. The greatest benefits will be reaped 
by investing in the middle of the distribution. Reasoned from an economic 
perspective, focusing investment on the lower classes will not be cost-effective, 
but focusing on the middle classes will, thereby making the social investment 
state a vehicle of inequality (Taylor-Gooby, 2013: 65-71). The social investment 
state is also more service-orientated than its predecessors. In-kind services are 
less effective at reaching the lower classes than in-cash benefits. Due to this 
shift from offering benefits in cash to giving services-in-kind the re-distributive 
capacity of the welfare system is less effective from an egalitarian point of view 
(Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009: 653-5). 
Pintelon et al (2013) argue that social stratification based on social class 
still persists in the occurrence of social risks. The social risks of ill-health, 
unemployment, living in a jobless-household and performing low-wage work 
are still more prominent in the lower classes despite the implementation of social 
investment strategies. Pintelon et al. argue that the use of labor-market-related 
benefits as stimuli for full participation in the labor market promotes an unequal 
distribution of welfare. Labor market participation is still heavily mediated by 
social class. Thus linking welfare benefits to individual responsibility may give 
way to a Matthew-effect due to the class effects on labor market participation. 
Cantillon (2011) confirms this hypothesis in her study on the disappointing 
poverty rates that exist after the formulation and partial implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy. She states that social spending based on the principles of the 
social investment perspective flows mainly to middle- and higher-income groups 
and does not adequately reach work-poor households, resulting in unchanged 
poverty rates. Class differences in the use of childcare also exist. The lower 
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classes tend to make less use of childcare services than their counterparts from 
the higher classes. Increased funding for early childcare education therefore 
benefits the groups who already make use of these services. This type of funding 
thus reaches the higher classes more than the lower classes (Van Lanckers & 
Ghysels, 2012). Not only does class play a role in the distribution of social risks, 
but gender also plays an important role. Informal care is usually provided by 
women (Van den Broek, 2013) who are therefore more susceptible to physical 
and psychological harm. The shift of responsibilities from state to individual 
increases the risk of unemployment for women due to injuries sustained during 
the provision of informal care or reductions in working hours due to informal 
care obligations which results in less social protection.
Confronting the ideas of the social investment state with the premises of the 
capability approach leads to important insights. In the social investment paradigm, 
the well-being of citizens depends on their ability to make decisions that contribute 
to their well-being and on their willingness to make these decisions. The social 
investment state offers opportunities to improve capabilities if necessary, along 
with information and incentives to improve willingness. In the social investment 
state, the target group of social policies is considered sufficiently willing to take 
advantage of the opportunities that are offered in the social investment state, and 
also sufficiently capable of doing this. By willingness, we mean that in the social 
investment paradigm, citizens are considered to be rational utility-maximizers, 
motivated to follow courses of action that are in their own self-interest. By ability 
we mean that the social investment paradigm assumes that citizens are capable 
of recognizing courses of action that are in their own self-interest. The social 
investment paradigm produces new social risks if these assumptions are not – or 
not fully – met in reality. This brings us to a discussion of the social risks of the 
social investment state in the next section.  
A TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL RISKS IN  
THE SOCIAL INVESTMENT STATE
In this section we propose a typology of social investment risks in a welfare 
state of increasing individual responsibility. We distinguish four groups of social 
risks in social investment states. These risks are based on the basic paradigms 
of the social investment state on the one hand, and the assumption of willing 
and capable individuals on the other. If we combine these basic paradigms 
with the potential lack of either capabilities or willingness to enter the welfare 
arrangements of the social investment state, we can distinguish four different 
social investment risks: 
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• Welfare illiteracy;
• The vicious cycle of ‘own fault’;
• Limited network ties; and 
• Limited moral articulation. 
In the next paragraphs we elaborate on and empirically illustrate these social 
investment risks using examples from the country that we know best: the 
Netherlands. However, in our opinion these risks may apply to countries from 
any welfare regime that is transforming into a social investment regime. 
Welfare illiteracy 
The distribution of social security and welfare is dependent on individual 
capabilities. This has always been the case, but the role of capabilities is 
becoming increasingly decisive. As recent research shows, socio-economic 
and educational differences between individuals even exist in the occurrence, 
detection and treatment of cancer. The suggestion has been made that differences 
in health literacy – ‘the individual capacity to obtain, process and understand 
basic health information and services needed to make appropriate decisions’ 
(Aarts, 2012: 237) – plays an important role in acquiring the right kind of 
health care. Placing the ‘literacy’ concept in a broader context, we can say that 
‘welfare literacy’ becomes more dominant in the distribution of social security 
and welfare in the changing social policy context of increasing self-sufficiency 
and self-control. The move towards personalized social services underpins this 
assumption.
One example of these personalized services is the personal budget (PGB) that 
was introduced through the Dutch public health service in 1996. Before that time 
public health was supply-orientated and mismatches between care recipient and 
care supplier were common. The personal budget was thus introduced to create a 
better match between both parties. The personal budget gives people the option 
to choose their own care supplier, which may be informal or formal, public or 
private. When someone becomes eligible for funded care under the Exceptional 
Medical Expenses Act (Awbz) or the Social Support Act (Wmo), the PGH gives 
them the option to choose care in-kind, or to be given a personal budget for the 
care they want and need. One of the most important characteristics of this policy 
measure is that care users have a maximum of freedom to choose how and 
where they want to spend their budget. In 2003 the ‘new style’ personal budget 
was introduced. The biggest and most prominent change was that money is now 
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directly transferred to the client without the intervention of a health institution, 
which was the former protocol. This gives the care user even more freedom than 
before. They are now responsible for paying their care suppliers (SCP, 2011). 
This example illustrates the increase in freedom and personal responsibility 
to choose a personal path to better welfare, as citizens see fit. The benefit of this 
kind of policy is that clients can regulate and buy the care and support they need 
without the interference of a third party. However, regulating one’s own care 
and support without the proper training or education is not the simplest of tasks. 
The welfare system is complex and changes over time because of innovation 
or political and economic developments. Several studies have shown that not 
everybody gets the welfare they are entitled to. The main reasons for citizens not 
using the welfare measures available to them are that they do not know of these 
measures, they think they are not eligible for them, or they do not know how to 
apply (SEO, 2011). This shows that welfare literacy is a big predictor of welfare 
accumulation. Welfare literacy – the individual capacity to obtain, process and 
understand welfare information and the services needed to make appropriate 
decisions – is likely to play a bigger role in the future of the welfare state. In 
neoliberal or social investment states, where personal responsibility and the 
freedom to choose one’s own welfare suppliers is increasingly emphasized, the 
amount of knowledge someone possesses about the welfare state will become 
more important under the influence of both the individualization and the 
personalization of social policy. 
Vicious cycle of ‘own fault’ (‘serves you right’) 
A key assumption in the social investment paradigm is that people should take 
the opportunities that they are offered. It is generally assumed that because of 
the omnipresence of scientific knowledge people are able to make well-informed 
choices about matters that affect their future. Following this rationale, it is the 
‘individual’s own fault’ when are unemployed because they chose an education 
or career based on emotional grounds (“because it makes me happy”) instead 
of rational grounds. The social investment risk of the vicious cycle occurs when 
citizens engage in behavior that is not in their own interest according to the 
social investment paradigm. The consequences of this ‘irresponsible’ behavior 
may involve sanctions in the form of the (partial) denial of services, or incentives 
aimed at correcting such behavior  
One of the most notable examples of this type of social investment risk is the 
so-called entry-exit paradox (see Kruiter et al., 2008). This paradox implies that 
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people are entitled to services or benefits because of the problems they have, but 
that these problems are also the reason why these services or benefits are denied. 
For instance, families in debt may be entitled to debt relief services but become 
ineligible for such services because of new debt they incur during the application 
of these programs. Other examples are youth with behavioral problems who are 
removed from behavioral training programs because they do not comply with 
the rules, and drug addicts who are sent away from the rehab clinic because 
they use drugs in the rehab facility. In these examples, the observed behavior 
is interpreted as a lack of willingness on the client side to behave responsibly, 
even though the causes of such behavior may be situated on a deeper level and 
may be more related to capabilities than willingness. However, welfare agencies 
may – and often do – treat behavior from a ‘willingness’ perspective, creating 
a vicious cycle in which support for clients – and solutions to their problems – 
remain out of reach. 
Limited network ties
An important element of the Dutch interpretation of the social investment 
paradigm is reliance of the networks of vulnerable citizens. For instance, the 
Social Support Act that was implemented by the Dutch Government in 2007 
focuses on the promotion of social integration of people with a disability. Local 
authorities play a key role in this act. The central government sets out the general 
framework, but it is up to local authorities to decide how they operate within this 
framework that consists of nine areas in which the local authorities are expected 
to perform. Area four is of special interest in relation to the new forms of social 
risk. This area focuses on the support of informal carers and volunteers. Informal 
carers are typically family, close friends, neighbors and acquaintances. People 
are expected to make use of existing network ties. Research shows that since 
2007/2008 more attention has been placed  on formally supporting this group 
by local authorities than other policy areas within the field of social policy. 
However, big differences exist between municipalities (SCP, 2010).
The above situation clearly shows that social policy is being increasingly 
directed towards reliance on informal care. But not everybody has an extensive 
network on which they can rely in the case of emergencies. Not only does the 
width of the network matter, but also the composition. As the case illustrates, 
people with a high demand for care are usually supported by people nearby 
(socially and geographically) and with whom they have a close connection; i.e., 
through bonding social capital. In this context it is better to have a large amount 
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of bonding social capital than bridging social capital. The case would probably 
be different in terms of finding a job in a time of harsh labor market conditions. 
Not only does the composition of social capital pose a risk, but also the 
incapability of individuals to manage their own networks in relation to 
welfare procurement. Because a network is not static but organic, it has to be 
nurtured and maintained properly to remain in existence. This requires skill in 
managing social relations and decision-making capabilities based on potential 
future reciprocity; i.e. social capital revenue (credit slips, Coleman, 1990). 
But the size of networks is not only dependent on the networking skill of the 
individual, but also on the potential supply of social relations which can be used 
to generate social capital. People who are socially excluded are therefore less 
able to establish networks from which they can gather social capital in relation 
to welfare procurement because they have less access to these potential social 
relations (Volker, Flap and Mollenhorst, 2013: 27-38).  
Moral Articulation 
As stated before, when people are not capable of caring for themselves, they 
are expected to rely on their personal networks. We argue that the activation of 
one’s personal network to acquire welfare poses the risk of moral articulation. 
Asking somebody to provide care or support may create a physical, psychological 
and social burden on the other. This situation may well challenge the normative 
beliefs regarding the limits of informal care and create a moral dilemma, making 
it harder for individuals to ask for help, and in some cases may even prevent 
people acquiring the support or care they need.
A recent study (Grootegoed & Dijk, 2012) illustrates this risk in the context 
of welfare state retrenchment and client autonomy in long-term care. This study 
was conducted in the Netherlands among disabled and elderly persons who have 
reduced access to long-term care and are expected to fall back on their family and 
friends. Through the analysis of 500 telephone interviews and 30 face-to-face 
interviews the authors concluded that most of the disabled and the elderly do not 
seek alternatives to the formal care they used to receive. In order to cope with the 
moral dilemma that is caused by the existing care cap, and not wanting to bother 
their family members or friends, they use different techniques to manage their 
moral problem. They mask the need for care in order to not border their relatives 
with responsibilities, which according the interviewees is ‘not their duty’. Or they 
use hinting techniques and avoid asking directly for support. Both techniques 
result in less care being received than is actually needed. This problem occurs 
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especially with people who relied on formal care in the past. People who used to 
receive informal care are less affected by retrenchment policies in long-term care. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have explored the risks and inequalities that are caused by the 
transition towards a social investment state. We argue that under the influence 
of individualization, glocalisation and the increasing emphasis on civil society, 
individual capabilities and social capital are becoming more important in the 
procurement of welfare. The risks we distinguish on theoretical grounds are 
welfare illiteracy, the lack of networks ties, the vicious cycle of ‘own fault’ 
and barriers of moral articulation. Any country that moves towards a social 
investment regime may be confronted with – and should be aware of – these 
risks. These risks are related to the main assumptions of social investment, 
namely: the importance of education, equality of opportunities, and the shift in 
responsibilities from the state to social relations and society. The basis of social 
investment risk is therefore different in nature than the new social risk defined 
by Bonoli (2005). New social risks are formed by changing socio-economic 
relations that result in mismatches with the earlier institutional framework. 
 This theoretical exploration of the risks of the social investment state 
offers three important insights for academics and policy-makers. First, the 
risks that we have identified in this paper are caused by erroneous behavioral 
assumptions in the social investment paradigm. Specifically, the paradigm 
might overestimate the capacities and the willingness of citizens to adhere 
to its basic assumptions. The measures that are taken to correct this behavior 
also start from the same set of behavioral assumptions. Rather than solving 
a client’s social problems through enabling interventions, these measures lead 
to the persistence of problems, or even a deterioration in clients’ well-being. 
Therefore, a detailed and systematic assessment of the behavioral assumptions 
in the social investment paradigm is much needed. This assessment should be 
aimed specifically at the position of the most vulnerable groups in society. 
Second, the social investment paradigm seems to reinforce existing differences 
between social classes rather than redistribute resources among social classes. 
Many of the instruments of the social investment state are aimed at citizens 
that are capable and willing of improving their situations. Most notably, (lower) 
middle classes seem to benefit from the move towards a social investment 
paradigm, whereas people in the most vulnerable positions see the gap between 
them and the middle classes widening (see Cantillon, 2011). 
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Third, in this article we have tentatively identified some new risks that may 
be related to the social investment paradigm. Even though countries with 
different types of welfare systems have implemented elements of the social 
investment paradigm (see Hemerijck, 2017), the ways in which the social 
investment paradigm has been implemented differ significantly. This may lead 
to different outcomes in terms of the persistence of inequality and the position of 
vulnerable groups. We therefore make a plea for a systematic comparison of the 
implementation and outcomes of the shift towards social investment in different 
welfare regimes. Such a systematic comparison may focus on the benefits of the 
social investment paradigm, but should not be blind to social investment risks. 
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